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Envisioning the FTC as a Facilitator 
of Blockchain Technology Adoption in 
the Direct-to-Consumer Genetic 
Testing Industry 
ABSTRACT 
Seemingly overnight, the kingpins of the direct-to-consumer 
genetic testing (DTC-GT) industry shifted their focus from exploring 
their customers’ DNA to commodifying it. Companies like Ancestry or 
23andMe that were once exclusively known as mere sources of 
“infotainment” now regularly sell consenting customers’ genetic data to 
pharmaceutical researchers or use it to develop drugs of their own. To 
gain these customers’ consent, both firms employ a series of long, complex 
clickwrap contracts that largely fail to apprise their readers of the 
potential risks of sharing their genetic data. Nor do these agreements 
provide any form of compensation to those consumers whose data 
ultimately facilitates the development of a new, profitable drug.  
Understandably, the relative autonomy major DTC-GT firms 
wield over their customers’ genetic information—and the manner in 
which that autonomy is gained—raises serious privacy and bioethical 
concerns. More directly, it reflects a stark lack of federal oversight of the 
data management and storage practices of the DTC-GT industry as a 
whole. The emerging patchwork of state consumer privacy laws—while 
certainly more robust than any existing federal legislation—likewise 
falls short in fully protecting the privacy and dignitary interests of the 
DTC-GT consumers whose genetic data is shared and mined for profit.  
This is not to say that DTC-GT consumers should be uniformly 
prohibited from contributing their genetic data to medicinal research. 
Such behavior should be encouraged to the extent this information can 
be transferred and stored securely. Nevertheless, the current exploitation 
of consumer data by major DTC-GT firms may, over the long term, 
inhibit medicinal progress by undermining demand for genetic testing 
and, thus, the pool of genetic data available for research. Accordingly, 
consumers and researchers alike would benefit from a more secure and 
equitable method of exchanging genetic information.  
This Note argues that the recent advent of “blockchain 
genomics”—a form of exchange that allows consumers to securely loan 
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out their genetic information for research purposes in return for 
compensation—fits that bill. With mainstream DTC-GT firms unlikely 
to adopt such a system and no legislative solution on the horizon, this 
Note further suggests a role for the FTC, the country’s de facto privacy 
regulator, to nudge major DTC-GT firms in that direction by exercising 
various tools of its soft regulatory authority. 
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Over the last decade, titans of the direct-to-consumer genetic 
testing (DTC-GT) industry, such as 23andMe and Ancestry, have 
fashioned themselves into monolithic “banks” of genetic information.1 
These DNA-testing companies have adopted business models that 
prioritize the sale of consumer genetic data to third parties that seek to 
make advancements in medical research.2 For example, pharmaceutical 
giant GlaxoSmithKline recently purchased a $300 million stake in 
23andMe, providing the company access to 23andMe’s trove of genetic 
data to develop new drugs.3 Similarly, Ancestry partnered with Calico, 
a covert Google spin-off, to study aging and life extension.4 All told, by 
 
 1. See Antonio Regalado, More than 26 Million People Have Taken an At-Home Ancestry 
Test, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612880/more-than-26-
million-people-have-taken-an-at-home-ancestry-test/ [https://perma.cc/AK9X-N8NY] (“By the 
start of 2019, more than 26 million consumers had added their DNA to four leading commercial 
ancestry and health databases, according to our estimates. If the pace continues, the gene troves 
could hold data on the genetic makeup of more than 100 million people within 24 months.”);  
Cynthia McFadden, Aliza Nadi & Rich Schapiro, DNA Test Company 23andMe Now Fueling  
Medical Research, NBCNEWS (Jan. 17, 2019, 7:10 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-
news/dna-test-company-23andme-now-fueling-medical-research-n958651 [https://perma.cc/AFR2-
7JJF] (“[N]o other gene bank . . . comes close to matching 23andMe’s size.”). 
 2. See Nicole Martin, How DNA Companies like Ancestry and 23andMe Are Using  
Your Genetic Data, FORBES (Dec. 5, 2018, 2:49 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicolemar-
tin1/2018/12/05/how-dna-companies-like-ancestry-and-23andme-are-using-your-genetic-data/ 
#15c1d8916189 [https://perma.cc/CXT3-85PG]. 
 3. Jamie Ducharme, A Major Drug Company Now Has Access to 23andMe’s Genetic Data. 
Should You Be Concerned?, TIME (July 26, 2018, 3:47 PM), https://time.com/5349896/23andme-
glaxo-smith-kline/ [https://perma.cc/7JN5-LK9Z]. This is one of at least fourteen other  
partnerships 23andMe has established with a third party. ANDELKA M PHILLIPS, BUYING YOUR 
SELF ON THE INTERNET: WRAP CONTRACTS AND PERSONAL GENOMICS 131 (2019). 
 4. Erin Brodwin, DNA-Testing Companies like 23andMe Sell Your Genetic Data to  
Drugmakers and Other Silicon Valley Startups, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 3, 2018, 10:45 AM), 
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systematically granting itself “the right to manage our genomic 
information, to store it, and to profit from it,”5 the DTC-GT industry has 
reinvented itself as an intermediary in the genomic marketplace.6  
Unsurprisingly, this development has led to a slew of privacy 
and bioethical concerns. Critics point out that permitting DTC-GT firms 
to wield centralized authority over genetic data—whether by housing  
it under one roof or sharing it with the highest institutional  
bidder—carries a host of increasingly novel and untenable consumer 
risks.7 A single data breach resulting in the exposure of genetic 
information could, for example, subject affected consumers to certain 
forms of insurance discrimination,8 military discharge,9 or, one day, 
infiltration of their bank accounts.10 Moreover, because DNA 
constitutes a potent human identifier that cannot be changed, both the 
consumer and her family may bear these risks for the rest of their 
lives.11  
Separately, there is an emerging view that the DTC-GT 
industry’s status as an intermediary in the genomic marketplace 
violates the basic dignitary and identity interests of DTC-GT 




 5. NIKOLAY KULEMIN, SERGEY POPOV & ALEXEY GORBACHEV, THE ZENOME  
PROJECT: WHITEPAPER 21 (2017), https://zenome.io/download/whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
ME6H-7F5F]. 
 6. That is, the emerging market between consumers—the producers and potential sellers 
of genetic information—and the researchers who wish to buy it. See Halil Ibrahim Ozercan, Atalay 
Mert Ileri, Erman Ayday & Can Alkan, Realizing the Potential of Blockchain Technologies in  
Genomics, 28 GENOME RSCH. 1255, 1261 (2018). 
 7. Paramount among the concerns related to data centralization are (i) that it may  
permit firms to “act[] as unnecessary mediator[s]” between the “owners” of genetic data  
(consumers) and its “users” (genetic researchers) and (ii) that centralized servers “create single 
points of failure both in terms of service availability and data privacy.” Ozercan et al., supra note 
6, at 1255. 
 8. Can the Results of Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Affect My Ability to Get  
Insurance?, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, https://medlineplus.gov/genetics/understanding/dtcgenetic-
testing/dtcinsurancerisk/ [https://perma.cc/B772-J4FM] (Sept. 18, 2020) [hereinafter Insurance]. 
 9. Heather Murphy & Mihir Zaveri, Pentagon Warns Military Personnel Against  
At-Home DNA Tests, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/24/us/military-
dna-tests.html [https://perma.cc/6H2A-CV4V]. 
 10. See PHILLIPS, supra note 3, at 52 (describing the increased adoption of voice  
recognition into the security systems of various banks). 
 11. See Ellen Wright Clayton, Barbara J. Evans, James W. Hazel & Mark A. Rothstein, 
The Law of Genetic Privacy: Applications, Implications, and Limitations, 6 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 1, 
7 (2019), https://academic.oup.com/jlb/article/6/1/1/5489401 [https://perma.cc/DY9X-YBYB]. 
 12. Jessica L. Roberts, Theories of Genetic Ownership 51, 57 (Sept. 9, 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and  
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sale of genetic data—solicited by firms like 23andMe for vaguely stated 
“scientific research purposes”—exploits well-intentioned consumers 
and defies their inherent right to benefit from information that is 
fundamentally them.13 Ironically, this business model may undermine 
the long-term goals of the genetic research community: some 
researchers, for instance, fear that it increasingly disincentivizes 
would-be DTC-GT consumers from purchasing test kits, constraining 
the pool of available genetic information.14 Affording consumers the 
right to own and sell their information, they claim, is the best method 
of ensuring the information’s long-term flow.15  
The recent advent of “blockchain genomics” may provide the best 
model for remedying this array of concerns.16 A blockchain––defined 
broadly as a highly secure, decentralized data storage system––can 
allow its users to effectively “own” the data they generate. To that end, 
start-up genomic sequencing companies like Nebula Genomics have 
begun to utilize their own custom blockchain networks to provide 
customers with virtually the same services as DTC-GT companies, 
while also granting them sole ownership, access, and control over their 
data in an extremely secure fashion.17 Notably, these consumers may 
choose to anonymously sell or rent their information to researchers or 
pharmaceutical companies.18  
Because major DTC-GT companies have no real incentive to 
adopt blockchain systems of their own (and are unlikely to encounter 
one any time soon), this Note argues that the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) should nudge them in that direction.19 Specifically, 
it recommends that the FTC (i) exercise its repertoire of informational 
 
Bioethics at Harvard Law School), https://petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/assets/publications/Rob-
erts_Genetic_Ownership_Draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4MT-2U79]. 
 13. See Clayton et al., supra note 11, at 17–18; Roberts, supra note 12, at 57. This view 
roots itself in the principle of “genetic exceptionalism”—the idea that genetic information is so 
highly personal that it merits special treatment relative to other forms of personal data. See id. 
 14. See Dennis Grishin, Kamal Obbad, Preston Estep, Kevin Quinn, Sarah Wait Zaranek, 
Alexander Wait Zaranek, Ward Vandewege, Tom Clegg, Nico César, Mirza Cifric & George 
Church, Accelerating Genomic Data Generation and Facilitating Genomic Data Access Using  
Decentralization, Privacy-Preserving Technologies and Equitable Compensation, 1 BLOCKCHAIN IN 
HEALTHCARE TODAY, no. 1, 2018, at 1, 3–4. 
 15. See id. at 5–6. 
 16. Helen Albert, How Blockchain Companies Are Helping Us Protect Our Genomic Data, 
LABIOTECH.EU (June 26, 2019), https://www.labiotech.eu/genomics/blockchain-control-genomic-
data/ [https://perma.cc/S3CR-5NHR]. 
 17. Frost & Sullivan, Blockchain Technology Empowering Genetics, ALL. OF ADVANCED 
BIOMEDICAL ENG’G (2018), https://aabme.asme.org/posts/blockchain-technology-empowering-ge-
netics [https://perma.cc/4472-92JP]. 
 18. Albert, supra note 16. 
 19. Infra Part IV. 
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resources—including its newfound “Blockchain Working Group”—to 
educate consumers, researchers, and firms on the utility of blockchain 
technology as a management system for genetic data and (ii) craft 
voluntary standards that promote its adoption. Part I lays out both the 
function of the DTC-GT industry and its reliance on self-regulation to 
govern its use of genetic data. Part II assesses how this system of  
self-governance perpetuates the privacy and bioethical issues 
previously described, and Part III explains why blockchain systems 
may serve as the most effective method of confronting them. Part IV 
diagrams the two-pronged strategy the FTC should employ to facilitate 
the DTC-GT industry’s adoption of blockchain technologies and offers 
concluding remarks. 
I. THE DTC-GT INDUSTRY’S LEGAL LANDSCAPE AND INHERENT PRIVACY 
CONCERNS 
A. The DTC-GT Industry at a Glance 
1. Present and Future State of the DTC-GT Market 
There are roughly ninety private, US-based DTC-GT companies 
which offer four general categories of services: family relationship, 
ancestry and genealogy, lifestyle and wellness, and health.20 The 
process underpinning these services is fairly uniform: consumers 
purchase a test kit and, once the kit is received, submit a sample of 
genetic material (generally saliva) in return.21 After the test is 
analyzed, the firm conveys its results to the consumer, usually via an 
online platform.22 Based on their findings, some DTC-GT firms may 
offer their users continual health or ancestry updates as their 
respective databases grow.23  
Overall, the DTC-GT industry is now largely oriented toward 
providing ancestry- and relationship-focused products, although 
predictive tests—which indicate an individual’s genetic predispositions 
and risks for certain diseases—continue to increase in popularity.24 
 
 20. James W. Hazel & Christopher Slobogin, Who Knows What, and When?: A Survey of 
the Privacy Policies Proffered by U.S. Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Companies, 28 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 35, 47 (2018). 
 21. PHILLIPS, supra note 3, at 13. 
 22. Id. at 13. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Clayton et al., supra note 11, at 16–17; see Megan A. Allyse, David H. Robinson,  
Matthew J. Ferber & Richard R. Sharp, Direct-to-Consumer Testing 2.0: Emerging Models of  
Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing, 93 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 113, 119 (2018), https://www.mayo-
clinicproceedings.org/action/showPdf?pii=S0025-6196%2817%2930772-3. 
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This shift marks the industry’s rapid transformation from a source of 
“infotainment” (i.e., entertainment-driven information) to a private 
provider of legitimate health-like services25 and is largely attributable 
to (i) the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) newly relaxed 
approach to predictive testing,26 (ii) the decreasing costs of genomic 
sequencing,27 and (iii) the increasing ease in which genetic data is 
shared.28  
By increasing the scope and accessibility of their services over 
the past ten years, DTC-GT firms have exponentially expanded their 
general market.29 For example, industry kingpins like 23andMe grew 
from one hundred thousand to twelve million total customers within 
this period of time.30 Such growth has enabled the four leading US  
DTC-GT firms (23andMe, Ancestry, FamilyTreeDNA, and MyHeritage) 
to aggregate the genetic information of more than twenty-six million 
individuals—a pool of information large enough to identify at least a 
majority of Americans with European descent.31 By 2021, that same 
pool is projected to contain the genetic code of roughly one hundred 
million people.32 Notwithstanding this projected growth, it should be 
noted that major firms like 23andMe have hit a slow period, potentially 
due to increasing concern amongst consumers regarding the privacy of 
 
 25. See Allyse et al., supra note 24, at 113–14, 119. But see Grishin et al., supra note 14, 
at 3 (stating that, at present, DTC-GT consumers are primarily interested in “infotainment”). This 
growth is largely owed to the FDA’s landmark decision to authorize 23andMe to “market a carrier 
test for Bloom Syndrome in 2015.” Clayton et al., supra note 11, at 16. 
 26. See Clayton et al., supra note 11, at 16. Soon after, the agency announced its intention 
to exempt 23andMe’s “Genetic Health Risk” tests from premarket review in order to provide “other, 
similar tests to enter the market as quickly as possible and in the least burdensome way.” Id. at 
17. The firm, capitalizing on the FDA’s receptiveness, now markets tests for fourteen different 
conditions, including Parkinson’s and Alzheimer’s disease. DNA Reports List, 23ANDME, 
https://www.23andme.com/dna-reports-list/ [https://perma.cc/3AEM-LHHW] (last visited Jan. 28, 
2021). 
 27. Grishin et al., supra note 14, at 2. 
 28. See Kim Hart, Genetic Testing Firms Share Your DNA Data More than You Think, 
AXIOS (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.axios.com/dna-test-results-privacy-genetic-data-sharing-
4687b1a0-f527-425c-ac51-b5288b0c0293.html [https://perma.cc/CA5C-AG8B]. 
 29. See Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 20, at 37 n.5 (“The market value of the US  
DTC . . . industry grew from a humble $15 million in 2010 to over $210 million in 2017 and is 
projected to reach $350 million by 2020.”). 
 30. History, 23ANDME, https://mediacenter.23andme.com/assets/timeline/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/AQ72-CVQR] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021); About Us, 23ANDME, https://mediacen-
ter.23andme.com/company/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/DS3T-UVU2] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021). 
 31. Regalado, supra note 1; Heather Murphy, Most White Americans’ DNA Can Be  
Identified Through Genealogy Databases, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/10/11/science/science-genetic-genealogy-study.html [https://perma.cc/NPA2-9HP6]. 
 32. Regalado, supra note 1. 
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their data.33 Nevertheless, the velocity of these firms’ rise begs two 
questions: what genetic information are consumers increasingly 
relinquishing to DTC-GT firms, and what could happen if that 
information falls into the wrong hands? 
2. How DTC-GT Firms Process Genetic Data (and How That Might 
Change) 
Generally, there are two methods of processing a genetic  
test: genotyping and sequencing.34 Genotyping takes a figurative 
snapshot of a specific part of a donor’s genome to identify any number 
of predetermined genetic variants that are associated with certain 
traits, characteristics, and diseases.35 Sequencing, on the other hand, is 
much more comprehensive insofar as it may be used to identify those 
same known and unknown variants unique to a single donor by 
analyzing entire or specific strands of DNA.36 To highlight this 
difference in scope, it may be helpful to think of the letters that 
comprise our genetic code as “words on a [book] page, telling a story, 
chapter by chapter.”37 Genotyping is akin to processing a patchwork of 
random, scattered words; sequencing, on the other hand, can effectively 
process entire chapters.38 
Notwithstanding the greater amount of genetic information that 
sequencing can derive, market-leading DTC-GT firms like 23andMe 
exclusively rely on genotyping to process genetic samples, largely on the 
belief that sequencing—in light of its cumbersome, lengthy, and 
expensive nature—is simply not necessary to satisfy consumer 
 
 33. Daniel Roberts, Once-Hot DNA Testing Unicorn 23andMe Is in Serious Trouble, 
YAHOO FIN. (Jan. 29, 2020), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/oncehot-dna-testing-unicorn-23-and-
me-is-in-serious-trouble-115817212.html [https://perma.cc/MT2A-4KMC]. 
 34. See What Is Genotyping?, THERMOFISHER SCI., https://www.thermofisher.com/us/en/ 
home/life-science/pcr/real-time-pcr/real-time-pcr-learning-center/genotyping-analysis-real-time-
pcr-information/what-is-genotyping.html [https://perma.cc/D47A-4QMY] (last visited Oct. 31, 
2019). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Genotyping vs. Sequencing: What’s the Difference?, ORIG3N, https://orig3n.com/blog/ 
genotyping-vs-sequencing-whats-the-difference/ [https://perma.cc/3ZFF-UFC8] (last visited Oct. 
31, 2019).  
 37. Elissa Levin, DNA Technologies 101: Genotyping vs. Sequencing, and What They Mean 
for You, HELIX: RSCH. BLOG (Aug. 4, 2017), https://blog.helix.com/dna-technologies-genotyping-vs-
sequencing/ [https://perma.cc/JS4X-NCGZ]. 
 38. Id. 
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demand.39 That justification may be short-lived.40 For one, the price of 
whole-genome sequencing—a process that initially cost $2.7 billion and 
now gravitates around $1,000—continues to decrease.41 Moreover, as 
described, a growing number of companies have begun to offer complex 
and comprehensive health tests that require data that is more 
conveniently obtainable through sequencing.42 Finally (and perhaps 
most importantly), sequenced genomic data is, in light of its  
breadth, significantly more valuable to third-party researchers and 
pharmaceutical companies than genotyped data.43 It stands to reason, 
then, that these third parties would pay even more than they already 
do to access this information.44 Major firms like 23andMe and Ancestry 
that have experienced a decline in revenue would, logically, find such 
an offer highly appealing.45 Indeed, Ancestry recently announced the 
launch of a sequencing tool meant to inform consumers of their 
underlying health risks.46  
All told, these developments signal that major firms may soon 
adopt sequencing processes to accommodate their individual and 
institutional patrons, increasing the amount of genetic information 
they store and traffic.47 As mainstream DTC-GT firms increasingly use 
sequencing services, the corresponding privacy risks associated with 
patronizing them will grow.  
 
 39. See Difference Between DNA Genotyping & Sequencing, 23ANDME, https://customer-
care.23andme.com/hc/en-us/articles/202904600-Difference-Between-DNA-Genotyping-
Sequencing (last visited on Oct. 31, 2019). 
 40. See, e.g., Frost & Sullivan, supra note 17 (projecting 15 percent of the global population 
to sequence their DNA by 2025). 
 41. Megan Molteni, Now You Can Sequence Your Whole Genome for Just $200, WIRED 
(Nov. 19, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/whole-genome-sequencing-cost-200-dol-
lars/ [https://perma.cc/8TLP-F2WV] (covering one genome sequencing company that offered its  
services for $199). Even the more expensive sequencing services occasionally offer a promotional 
discount to “send[] a clear signal . . . that the $99 genome will be here in three to five years.” Id.  
 42. Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 20, at 63. 
 43. See Grishin et al., supra note 14, at 2 (describing how genotyping is generally less 
valuable to researchers because it “does not allow [for the] discovery of novel variants, including 
those that cause disease”).  
 44. See Sarah Watts & Kristen Hovet, Your Genetic Data Is the New Oil. These Startups 
Will Pay to Rent It., LEAPSMAG (Sept. 21, 2018), https://leapsmag.com/your-genetic-data-is-the-
new-oil-these-startups-will-pay-to-rent-it/ [https://perma.cc/G7ND-DWZ5] (detailing the recent  
series of lucrative DTC-GT partnerships involving third-party researchers and their underlying 
desire to access better, less-restricted data). 
 45. Roberts, supra note 12, at 55. 
 46. Christina Farr, Ancestry to Lay Off 6% of Workforce Because of a Slowdown in the 
Consumer DNA-Testing Market, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/05/ancestry-layoffs-of-
6percent-100-people-amid-dna-test-slowdown.html [https://perma.cc/T42W-LNYC] (Feb. 5, 2020, 
5:40 PM).  
 47. Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 20, at 63. 
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B. Risks of Sharing Genetic Data 
The current privacy risks associated with consuming DTC-GT 
services are forthright. Major firms like 23andMe, as with any firm that 
stores personal data, openly admit their security systems can be 
breached.48 Few realize, however, how catastrophic this could be.49 In 
the event of a breach, leaked genetic information could be used by  
non-health insurers (i.e., disability insurers, long-term care insurers, or 
life insurers) or lenders to discriminate against policyholders or loan 
applicants;50 by foreign countries seeking to exploit national security 
vulnerabilities (e.g., by leveraging a high-up US official’s predisposition 
to a certain disease as blackmail);51 by law enforcement to prosecute 
genetic donors (or their families);52 or for mass surveillance purposes.53  
Some of those scenarios may not appear pressing. Permitting 
law enforcement, for example, to cross-reference crime scene DNA with 
publicly available genetic data––a practice already used to catch 
criminals like the notorious Golden State Killer54––may seem desirable. 
That assumes, however, that the genetic data used on either end of the 
cross-referencing is genuine, which is not guaranteed. As technology 
evolves, it grows increasingly likely that genetic data may be used to 
emulate and steal another person’s identity, allowing nefarious actors, 
for example, to use synthetic DNA to frame another person for a crime.55 
 
 48. See, e.g., Privacy Policy, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/about/privacy/ 
[https://perma.cc/XZ3V-GP6S] (Oct. 30, 2020) (“[W]e cannot guarantee the confidentiality and  
security of your information due to the inherent risks associated with storing and transmitting 
data electronically.”). 
 49. Amy Brown, DNA Testing Is Popular, but Many Are Unaware of Privacy Concerns, 
TRIPLEPUNDIT (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.triplepundit.com/story/2018/dna-testing-popular-
many-are-unaware-privacy-concerns/55936 [https://perma.cc/N39D-RU39] (“There is almost a 
complete lack of awareness among the public about [these] issue[s] . . . [instead, t]he DNA kits are 
being viewed as stocking stuffers or cocktail party conversation.”). 
 50. Insurance, supra note 8; Hack of DNA Website Exposes Data from 92 Million Accounts, 
THE DIGIT. AGE BLOG (June 7, 2018), http://www.thedigitalageblog.com/cyber-security/hack-of-
dna-website-exposes-data-from-92-million-accounts/ [https://perma.cc/ZZ26-TTZT]. 
 51. See Murphy & Zaveri, supra note 9. 
 52. PHILLIPS, supra note 3, at 152. 
 53. Shawn Snow, Pentagon Advises Troops to Not Use Consumer DNA Kits, Citing  
Security Risks, MIL. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2019), https://www.militarytimes.com/2019/12/24/pentagon-
advises-troops-to-not-use-consumer-dna-kits-citing-security-risks/ [https://perma.cc/6FBZ-3UB4] 
(“[T]here is increased concern in the scientific community that outside parties are exploiting the 
use of genetic data for questionable purposes, including mass surveillance and the ability to track 
individuals without their authorization or awareness.”). 
 54. Gina Kolata & Heather Murphy, The Golden State Killer Is Tracked Through a Thicket 
of DNA, and Experts Shudder, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/27/ 
health/dna-privacy-golden-state-killer-genealogy.html [https://perma.cc/UC2C-69RS]. 
 55. PHILLIPS, supra note 3, at 52. 
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Indeed, biometric information (such as fingerprints) is already at risk 
of being used by criminal organizations to infiltrate private bank 
accounts.56 
While some consumers may consider these scenarios to be 
remote problems, two points bear emphasis: because DNA is immutable 
and a potent human identifier, it renders any victim of genetic fraud 
perpetually helpless to seen and unforeseen uses by bad actors;57 and 
likewise it implicates family members who share the same genetic 
code.58 Thus, should genetic data fall into the wrong hands, individuals 
who never actually consented to genetic testing in the first place may 
be rendered indefinitely vulnerable to attack.  
C. Informed Consent: Nonexistent or a Virtual Fiction in the DTC-GT 
Industry 
1. Privacy Policies as a Mechanism of Self-Governance 
As elaborated in Section I.D, there is no meaningful federal 
oversight of the DTC-GT industry’s management of consumer data.59 
Accordingly, clickwrap agreements now serve as the industry’s 
exclusive governance mechanism.60 Such agreements, in a nutshell, are 
digitized contracts of adhesion that bind the consumer after she 
indicates notice and consent by the click of a button (i.e., “I agree”).61 
Notably, clickwrap agreements need not display those terms on the 
same page as the button used to indicate consent in order for the 
provider to give proper notice; embedding a digital link will likely 
suffice.62  
 
 56. Id.  
 57. See Clayton et al., supra note 11, at 7; Martin, supra note 2 (“[A] DNA leak would be 
much worse than a credit leak because simply, you cannot change your DNA.”). 
 58. Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 20, at 43; Rachele M. Hendricks-Sturrup & Christine Y. 
Lu, Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Data Privacy: Key Concerns and Recommendations Based 
on Consumer Perspectives, J. PERSONALIZED MED., June 2019, at 1, 2 (2019) (noting the New Jersey 
attorney general’s 2017 warning to Ancestry customers that DNA information “may be used 
against ‘you or a genetic relative’”). 
 59. See Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 20, at 40 (“[T]hese laws generally do not directly 
implicate the bulk of the DTC-GT industry[.]”). The lack of a regulatory response may also stem 
from the DTC-GT industry’s inability to “fit neatly into existing legal categories” because it frames 
health and biological tests as consumer services. PHILLIPS, supra note 3, at 27. 
 60. PHILLIPS, supra note 3, at 28. 
 61. Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 20, at 38; see also PHILLIPS, supra note 3, at 28. 
 62. MARGO H.K. TANK & DAVID WHITAKER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CLICKWRAP FOR 
LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE AGREEMENTS. 4–5 (2019), https://www.docusign.com/sites/default/files/ 
the_effectiveness_of_clickwrap_for_legally_enforceable_agreements_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
2FSW-H8LM].  
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Critics argue that allowing DTC-GT firms to draft and conceal 
their own terms behind a hyperlink impedes the consumer’s ability to 
understand the consequences of purchasing a test kit.63 The standard 
response of a DTC-GT firm, of course, would be that once it provides the 
consumer with sufficient notice of its terms, it can do no more; it is her 
obligation—at least legally—to actually read the agreement.64 This, as 
described in Section I.C.2, ignores the fact that some consumers may 
lack the skills or scientific background to truly grasp the consequences 
of the agreement.65 Moreover, it fails to acknowledge the relative 
abundance of DTC-GT firms which either do not provide consumers any 
privacy terms or leave out crucial information within their 
agreements.66  
Indeed, in a survey of all ninety US-based DTC-GT companies, 
thirty-five neglected to provide a privacy policy, leaving consumers in 
the dark as to how their “genetic data was collected, used, or shared.”67 
Of the fifty-five firms found to offer a policy, only five allow consumers 
to delete all of their data;68 forty do not discuss ownership of genetic 
material or the data resulting from its analysis;69 forty-nine vaguely 
commit to keeping consumer genetic data secure (as opposed to the 
seventeen that specifically note their use of encryption);70 fifty-two 
provide “no information regarding how the company would deal with a 
security breach or whether an affected consumer would be notified;”71 
and twenty-three indicate that data may be shared with third parties 
with or without express consent.72 Finally, “almost all companies” 
maintain the ability to change their privacy policy “at any time,” often 
without having to notify the consumer.73  
2. Lack of Transparency and the Problem of (Un)Informed Consent 
Despite the DTC-GT industry’s general reluctance to publicly 
state clear privacy terms (or any terms at all), studies suggest DTC-GT 
 
 63. PHILLIPS, supra note 3, at 28; Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 20, at 38. 
 64. See Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Courts have 
also been more willing to find the requisite notice for constructive assent where the . . . user is 
required to affirmatively acknowledge the agreement before proceeding with use of the website.”). 
 65. Infra Section I.C.2. 
 66. Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 20, at 48. 
 67. Id. at 48. 
 68. Id. at 51. 
 69. Id. at 52. 
 70. Id. at 53. 
 71. Id. at 53. 
 72. Id. at 55. 
 73. Id. at 57. 
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consumers “feel[] relatively well-informed about the privacy 
implications of purchasing a genetic test.”74 This discrepancy might be 
explained by the unusually comprehensive policies offered by the 
handful of market-dominating firms—namely, 23andMe and 
Ancestry.75 Both firms, for example, go so far as to require informed 
consent to share a consumer’s individual-level data with third parties;76 
allow users to delete their account information;77 claim to share only 
“de-identified” or “aggregated” individual-level data that is stripped of 
personal identifiers;78 and vaguely commit to maintaining “industry 
standard” or “comprehensive” encryption software subject to 
independent security certification and continual audit.79 
While these assurances exceed industry norms, they still fall 
short of fully addressing extant consumer privacy concerns. For one, 
requiring informed consent to share genetic data may simply not be an 
adequate way of informing or protecting an individual’s interest in her 
genetic privacy.80 Of the roughly eight million 23andMe consumers who 
have consented to sharing their genetic data,81 some may lack the 
literacy skills to fully comprehend the complex terms in front of them.82 
Others may fail to foresee the full gambit of consequences attached to 
the potential leakage of their genetic data,83 or, as is the habit of 90 
percent of US consumers, might simply skim or skip the terms 
entirely.84 Even those who actually read and comprehend these terms 
 
 74. Emily Christofides & Kieran O’Doherty, Company Disclosure and Consumer  
Perceptions of the Privacy Implications of Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing, 35 NEW 
GENETICS & SOC’Y 101, 117 (2016). Many consumers, for example, wrongly assumed that their 
genetic sample would be destroyed after testing. Id. 
 75. Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 20, at 44, 63; Christofides & O’Doherty, supra note 74, 
at 117–18. 
 76. Individual Data Sharing Consent, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/about/indi-
vidual-data-consent/ [https://perma.cc/3HAY-36GE] (last visited Jan. 15, 2020); see Your Privacy, 
ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/privacystatement [https://perma.cc/3NER-DZVV] 
(last visited Jan. 28, 2021).  
 77. Privacy Policy, supra note 48; Your Privacy, supra note 76. 
 78. Privacy Policy, supra note 48; Your Privacy, supra note 76.  
 79. Privacy Policy, supra note 48; Your Privacy, supra note 76.  
 80. Christofides & O’Doherty, supra note 74, at 118. 
 81. See 23andMe for Scientists, 23ANDME, https://web.archive.org/web/20200222214128/ 
https://research.23andme.com/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2020) (claiming over 10 million kits sold, and 
that “80% of customer’s consent to research”). 
 82. Hendricks-Sturrup & Lu, supra note 58, at 2. 
 83. See supra Section I.B (discussing the risks of genetic exposure). 
 84. Caroline Cakebread, You’re Not Alone, No One Reads Terms of Service Agreements, 
BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 15, 2017, 6:30 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/deloitte-study-91-per-
cent-agree-terms-of-service-without-reading-2017-11 [https://perma.cc/BX9Z-92RL]. In the  
DTC-GT context, this may be attributed to the consumer assuming a false sense of security by the 
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of consent are still kept in the dark as to how their genetic data will be 
shared. Neither 23andMe nor Ancestry, for example, obligate 
themselves to inform consenting consumers when their data is shared, 
where it is sent, how it will be protected by the recipient, and whether 
or not it can be retrieved upon the consumer’s request.85 Customers of 
these firms also go unwarned that their de-identified genetic data may 
be reidentified.86 Collectively, these deficiencies suggest that a 
customer of either firm who consents to sharing her data for research 
purposes effectively relinquishes control, perhaps permanently, over 
her own genetic profile, precluding her from acting on a future change 
of heart and increasing her or her relatives’ risk of genetic 
identification. 
Additionally, both 23andMe and Ancestry require consumers  
to send their genetic samples to independent genotyping lab  
facilities (which analyze and store genetic information) without  
further consent.87 These labs—seemingly defying consumer 
expectations88— retain user data for “regulatory compliance purposes,” 
even after they issue a request for its deletion.89 No information related 
to these facilities’ data management or security practices is provided in 
either company’s privacy policy.90 Thus, to some degree, even standard  
DTC-GT consumers risk genetic exposure. 
3. General Security Concerns 
While DTC-GT consumers may feel well informed about their 
general privacy rights, they nonetheless appear squeamish about how 
 
mere presence of an informed consent requirement. See Christofides & O’Doherty, supra note 74, 
at 118 (“[C]onsumers often mistake the presence of a privacy policy for the protection of privacy.”). 
 85. See Privacy Policy, supra note 48 (demonstrating a lack of any of these protections in 
23andMe’s privacy policy). 
 86. Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 20, at 44. To “re-identify” de-identified genetic data, a 
malicious actor need only identify certain personal traits (i.e., eye and hair color) noted within the 
data and “cross-reference those traits against publicly-available demographic data to identify the 
donor.” Brown, supra note 49. 
 87. See Privacy Policy, supra note 48 (stating the consumer’s obligation to ship her saliva 
sample to a 23andMe-controlled processing center or a certified third-party laboratory); Your  
Privacy, supra note 76 (stating the company’s general practice of processing consumer DNA  
samples at one of its several independent laboratory partners). 
 88. See Christofides & O’Doherty, supra note 74, at 115 (“With regard to DNA samples, 
the most common response was that participants expected it to be destroyed after testing.”). 
 89. Eric Ravenscraft, How to Protect Your DNA Data Before and After Taking an At-Home 
Test, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/12/smarter-living/how-to-pro-
tect-your-dna-data.html?login=smartlock&auth=login-smartlock [https://perma.cc/HN7R-5639]. 
 90. Privacy Policy, supra note 48; Your Privacy, supra note 76. 
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their data is actually secured and protected.91 This is likely due in part 
to the string of recent “electronic health record breaches” that 
implicated half of the US population, or the handful of DTC-specific 
breaches that have occurred—one of which resulted in the exposure of 
the personal (nongenetic) data of ninety-two million users.92 Indeed, 
malicious actors are successfully targeting privately stored health 
information at a record pace.93 While these efforts have largely 
concentrated on hospitals and other health care providers,94 the 
growing value of genetic data may render the genetic testing and 
research industries increasingly appealing targets for future breach 
attempts.95 
Given the incredibly vague nature in which major DTC-GT firms 
describe their information security systems, gauging the likely success 
of an attempted breach of any given firm’s data storage system is 
difficult.96 Because the use of third-party cloud storage and strong 
encryption software appears to be the norm,97 and, as some firms 
readily admit, such systems are not invulnerable to being hacked,98 the 
breach of a DTC-GT firm is at least plausible.99 Moreover, as 23andMe 
 
 91. See Hendricks-Sturrup & Lu, supra note 58, at 5 (citing several studies that  
demonstrate a widespread consumer belief that genetic data could be “easily hacked”). 
 92. Id.; Marcus Baram, The FTC Is Investigating DNA Firms like 23andMe and Ancestry 
over Privacy, FAST CO. (June 5, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/40580364/the-ftc-is-investi-
gating-dna-firms-like-23andme-and-ancestry-over-privacy [https://perma.cc/D5KD-CTHW]  
(discussing the breach of MyHeritage, an Israeli-based DTC-GT firm). 
 93. Waldemer W. Koczkodaj, Mirosław Mazurek, Dominik Strzałka, Alicja  
Wolny-Dominiak & Marc Woodbury-Smith, Electronic Health Record Breaches as Social  
Indicators, 141 SOC. INDICATORS RSCH. 861, 870 (2018) (“[S]tatistical evidence shows that data 
breaches of electronic health records have taken place at an unprecedented scale.”). 
 94. Id. at 862. 
 95. See id. at 869 (discussing the unique appeal of health information—which stems  
particularly from its immutability—to malicious actors who may seek to exploit it for financial 
gain). An attacker may, for example, wish to sell the genetic data back for ransom, or discretely 
sell it to unscrupulous insurance companies. Angela Chen, Why a DNA Data Breach Is Much Worse 
than a Credit Card Leak, THE VERGE (June 6, 2018, 3:54 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/ 
6/6/17435166/myheritage-dna-breach-genetic-privacy-bioethics [https://perma.cc/G6LN-YAZA]. 
 96. Supra Section I.C (discussing the pitfalls of DTC-GT privacy policies). 
 97. See Grishin et al., supra note 14, at 7 (“Storage and processing of genomic data has 
moved from local servers to remote clouds.”); Privacy Policy, supra note 48. 
 98. Privacy Policy, supra note 48 (“[W]e cannot guarantee the confidentiality and security 
of your information due to the inherent risks associated with storing and transmitting data  
electronically.”). 
 99. Koczkodaj et al., supra note 93, at 869. 
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recently demonstrated by sending the wrong test results to ninety-six 
customers, firms are always prone to simple human error.100 
D. Legislative Attempts to Regulate the DTC-GT Industry 
1. The Absence of Effective Federal Law 
Existing areas of DTC-GT-related federal law almost uniformly 
govern devices and test kits marketed by DTC-GT companies, not the 
genetic information they are used to collect.101 Those laws which 
implicate genetic data—namely, the Health Insurance Portability  
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the Genetic Information  
Non-Discrimination Act (GINA)—do not enforce any security or privacy 
norms in the DTC-GT industry.102  
HIPAA grants the Department of Health and Human Services 
the power to regulate the disclosure of “health information.”103 Yet, 
because HIPAA only applies to health care providers “or those who pay 
for it (such as insurers)” and not private entities who collect  
health-related information,104 the statute is largely inapplicable in the 
DTC-GT context.105 Moreover, even if DTC-GT firms fell within its 
purview, HIPAA’s exclusion of de-identified health information means 
it would hardly impact data-sharing practices among major firms  
like 23andMe, which exclusively share de-identified (but perhaps  
re-identifiable) genetic data.106  
 
 100. Jason Kincaid, 23andMe Sends Wrong DNA Test Results to 96 Customers, 
TECHCRUNCH (June 7, 2010, 10:24 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2010/06/07/23andme-sends-
wrong-dna-test-results-to-96-customers/ [https://perma.cc/A77P-UFSS]. 
 101. PHILLIPS, supra note 3, at 19, 27 (positing that “the most likely area of existing law” 
applicable to the DTC-GT industry is “the regulation of medical devices” and that “[o]verall there 
is a general lack of specific regulation for the DTC[-GT] industry globally” in light of its disruptive 
quality).  
 102. Clayton et al., supra note 11, at 10–14. 
 103. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No.  
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C. 
(2018)). HHS followed this statutory mandate by promulgating the Privacy Rule. 45 C.F.R.  
pts. 160, 164 (2019). The Privacy Rule “establishes national standards to protect individuals’  
medical records and other personal health information.” The HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T  
OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/555V-MRDE] (Dec. 10, 2020). 
 104. Clayton et al., supra note 11, at 14.  
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 12 (“The Privacy Rule also has glaring gaps in its framework for keeping people 
informed about who has been given access to their genetic information. For example, when a  
person’s genetic information is disclosed in a deidentified format, the Privacy Rule[] . . . [does] not 
require covered entities to tell the individual about the disclosure, even though deidentified genetic 
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GINA’s primary purpose is to prohibit employers and health 
insurers from discriminating against employees or the insured based on 
genetic information.107 While the statute extends the definition of 
“health information” to include “genetic information,”108 GINA is 
significantly weakened by its exclusion of non-health insurers, which 
enables disability, long-term care, and life insurers “the right to request 
medical information, including the results of any genetic testing, when 
making decisions about coverage and rates.”109 
2. Assessing State-Level Genetic Privacy Laws 
In the absence of effective federal law, nearly every state has 
enacted genetic privacy laws that differ in applicability and 
stringency.110 Of those, twenty-six states provide citizens a private right 
of action as a method of enforcement.111 Two of those states—Alaska 
and Nevada—have enacted the most “exemplary” laws.112 Alaska’s law 
stands out for its comprehensiveness; it requires, for instance, 
“informed and written consent” to collect, analyze, and retain 
information related to an individual’s DNA and recognizes (albeit 
vaguely) a person’s property right to their genetic information.113 It also 
permits citizens to recover up to $100,000 from any entity whose 
violation of the law “resulted in profit or monetary gain to the 
violator.”114 Yet, notably, the law does not grant the individual a right 
to control access to her genetic data,115 nor does it address how her 
supposed property right affects the sale of her information to a third 
party.116  
Nevada’s genetic privacy law is a little more thorough. It 
requires the same level of informed consent for all genetic testing but 
 
information is potentially reidentifiable.”). The Privacy Rule is also said to fail consumer interests 
by precluding individuals whose information is shared from legal action. Id. at 14. 
 107. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 
881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 108. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.  
 109. Insurance, supra note 8. 
 110. Clayton et al., supra note 11, at 12.  
 111. Leslie E. Wolf, Erin Fuse Brown, Ryan Kerr, Genevieve Razick, Gregory Tanner, 
Brett Duvall, Sakinah Jones, Jack Brackney & Tatiana Posada, The Web of Legal Protections for 
Participants in Genomic Research, 29 HEALTH MATRIX 1, 64 (2019). 
 112. State Genetic Privacy Policy, ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/state-policy/ge-
netic-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/8H3P-HM62] (last visited Oct. 31, 2019). 
 113. ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010 (2004). 
 114. ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.020. 
 115. State Genetic Privacy Policy, supra note 112. 
 116. Id. 
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also provides consumers with the ability to “inspect or obtain” their 
genetic information at any time and a guarantee that all genetic 
information “received for the purpose of a study [will] be destroyed upon 
the study’s completion or the donor’s withdrawal.”117 This mandatory 
erasure requirement allows consumers to revoke consent to having 
their data shared. However, as with Alaska, it is unclear whether this 
right applies to third parties who already received the data.  
The California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), the first  
state-level comprehensive data privacy law, perhaps comes the closest 
to addressing modern DTC-GT-related privacy concerns.118 Though  
not specifically aimed at protecting genetic information, the Act 
guarantees, among other provisions, four pertinent privacy rights to 
California citizens: (i) the right to be explicitly informed whether their 
personal information will be collected or shared;119 (ii) the right to know 
if and why their personal information has been shared with a specific 
category of third party in the past twelve months;120 (iii) the right to 
have their personal information deleted by the collecting business and 
its service providers (but not third-party partners);121 and (iv) the right 
to sue that business if, in the aftermath of a security breach which 
stems from its failure to “implement and maintain reasonable security 
procedures and practices,” their personal information is stolen or 
disclosed.122  
All told, the patchwork of state genetic privacy laws has created 
a “web of protection” that extends HIPAA-like obligations to DTC-GT 
firms.123 This, in turn, has spurred major DTC-GT firms to implement 
uniform privacy practices not required by federal law—namely, 
mandating a consumer’s informed consent to share genetic data with 
third parties. However, even informed consent requirements, as noted 
in Section I.C, are unlikely to sufficiently protect the privacy interests 
of DTC-GT consumers.124 Providing consumers with the right to have 
their genetic data deleted by any private entity who possesses it would, 
theoretically, be enough to offset this shortcoming. Nevertheless, no 
state—including Nevada and California—goes that far. Moreover, even 
if certain states were to adopt such a law, only their citizens would be 
 
 117. NEV. REV. STAT. § 629.161 (2015). 
 118. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–.199 (2018). 
 119. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.120. 
 120. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.130. 
 121. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105. 
 122. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150. 
 123. Wolf et al., supra note 111, at 44. 
 124. Supra Section I.C. 
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able to enforce it. To that end, a uniform, federal approach—which, as 
this Note advocates, should be spearheaded by the FTC—is desirable. 
II. BIOETHICAL ISSUES MANIFESTED BY DTC-GT SELF-REGULATION 
A. Ownership of Genetic Data and the Need for Equitable 
Compensation 
1. The Genetic Ownership Debate: Labor and Personhood Theories  
Several competing ideologies over the ownership of genetic data 
exist.125 Members of the biotech industry, for example, adopt a “labor 
theory” approach, which asserts that the efforts expended by 
researchers and employees in the processing and production of genetic 
data effectively qualifies it as a form of company property.126 They point 
to current US common law as set forth in Moore v. Regents of the 
University of California, which does not recognize an individual’s 
property right in their “excised cells,”127 as support for their view. 
Moreover, they vigorously emphasize that to afford individuals’ 
ownership rights would effectively strip the scientific community of its 
economic incentives, ossifying medical progress.128  
Consumer advocates, on the other hand, adopt a “personhood” 
approach, which rests on the natural intuition that humans inalienably 
own the information that defines their existence.129 To afford private 
entities the ability to sell genetic data, they hold, merely incentivizes 
the violation of fundamental identity and dignitary interests.130 They 
also highlight that US common law has yet to extend Moore to the 
genetic information contained within a human’s “excised cells.”131  
 
 125. Roberts, supra note 12, at 4–6. 
 126. Id. at 6. 
 127. Id. at 46. 
 128. Id. at 40. Notably, biotech companies are legally permitted to patent research that 
incorporates donated individual genetic material. Id. at 38. 
 129. Roberts, supra note 12, at 51. 
 130. Id. at 54. For example, indigenous groups with “uniquely appealing genetic profiles,” 
whose genetic material was harvested for scientific research without compensation, complained 
they were subjected to a form of “molecular colonialism.” Kara H. Ching, Note, Indigenous  
Self-Determination in an Age of Genetic Patenting: Recognizing an Emerging Human Rights Norm, 
66 FORDHAM L. REV. 687, 697 (1997). Another example which has received a significant amount of 
public scrutiny is the sequencing and publishing of the genome of Henrietta Lacks, which occurred 
without her family’s permission. Roberts, supra note 12, at 49.  
 131. Roberts, supra note 12, at 44. There is an argument that “the absence of ownership 
claims in genetic material—or more specifically excised cells—does not foreclose the possibility of 
an ownership claim in genetic information,” as common law cases such as Moore v. Regents of the 
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These two warring principles encapsulate the bioethical 
dilemma inherent in the DTC-GT industry’s use and sale of genetic data 
for medical research purposes.132 Few would seek to impede research 
that can potentially improve or save lives with (ostensibly) little harm 
to the consumer. Indeed, some DTC-GT consumers consent to share 
their genetic data because they want to further a form of genetic 
research.133 To legally recognize genetic data as a form of individual 
property could conceivably disturb this research process, perhaps by 
throwing the patentability of medical products influenced by DTC-GT 
consumer data into question, thereby weakening a major financial 
incentive for private research companies to pursue their work.134 
Nevertheless, as Professor Jessica Roberts notes, the industry’s 
commodification and near-autonomous control of genetic data raises 
clear “non-economic, identity, and dignity-related concerns” which 
seemingly compel the need for a middle ground to be struck.135 
2. The Wealth-Maximization Theory and the Case for Equitable 
Compensation 
To help rectify this dilemma, Roberts argues that the central 
goal of genetic ownership law should be redefined as the maximization 
of social welfare.136 This utilitarian framework broadly dictates that 
genetic ownership rights should be allocated on a case-by-case basis in 
the most socially beneficial manner––one that optimally recognizes the 
personal and economic interests at stake.137 Of course, how social 
optimality is defined and evaluated remains subjective, enabling 
variations of the same personhood-labor theory debate to remain viable 
(though Roberts slightly narrows the inquiry by suggesting human 
happiness as a suitable barometer).138 
Notwithstanding its lack of a bright-line rule, Roberts’ 
framework offers the most appropriate set of parameters to tackle the 
issues facing the DTC-GT industry and its consumers. It acknowledges, 
for example, the consumer’s limited bargaining power (e.g., her 
inability to control who her data can be shared with) as a strong 
 
University of California only address tangible human material (i.e., spleen cells) and not the  
genetic information they contain. Id. at 46. 
 132. McFadden et al., supra note 1. 
 133. Cf. Roberts, supra note 12, at 44–45 (discussing genetic donors’ altruistic motivations 
in the context of hospital-based research). 
 134. Id. at 40–41. 
 135. Id. at 52. 
 136. Id. at 63. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 59. 
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disincentive to would-be users and, thus, a constraining force on the 
pool of genetic data available for socially beneficial research.139 
Accordingly, to remedy this market defect, Roberts suggests improving 
the initial bargaining status of DTC-GT consumers by affording them 
“heightened rights in [their] genetic information.”140 
While workable in theory, even Roberts admits that the 
implementation of her framework on a case-by-case basis is limited in 
practicability.141 A more realistic solution, however, may simply be one 
which allows genetic researchers to compensate DTC-GT consumers 
directly in exchange for their data.142 This form of “equitable 
compensation”––while perhaps imperfect in its ability to fully address 
or offset the array of privacy concerns or dignitary injuries described in 
Part I––would certainly vindicate consumer interests at a higher level 
and continually incentivize individuals to contribute to genetic 
research.143 It would also cut out the need for researchers to depend on 
DTC-GT firms as data intermediaries, insulating their research efforts 
from a potential drop in demand for a specific DTC-GT firm’s services. 
Such offerings, of course, are unheard of in the DTC-GT space.144 
The genetic sequencing industry, however, is a different story. Indeed, 
in explicit recognition of the social welfare dilemma described above, 
several sequencing start-ups have begun to offer equitable 
compensation models for their customers.145 One model seeks to create 
a “genomic marketplace” that directly facilitates cryptocurrency 
transactions between researchers and consumers, who, through 
blockchain technology, may decide whether to rent or sell their data to 
an institutional suitor.146 Another, using similar technology, rewards 
consumers who share their genetic data with company stock.147 
These models, of course, are non-exhaustive; a DTC-GT firm 
that hypothetically chose to compensate its consumers could do so 
however it wished. The point remains––particularly in light of the 
escalation of lucrative DTC-GT industry partnerships––that major 
DTC-GT firms are capable of better incentivizing consumers to share 
 
 139. Id. at 60. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 63. 
 142. Grishin et al., supra note 14, at 6. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See, e.g., Individual Data Sharing Consent, supra note 76 (declaring that consumers 
whose genetic data ultimately contributes to the development of “new commercial products or  
services . . . will not receive any compensation”). 
 145. Grishin et al., supra note 14, at 4–5.  
 146. Id.  
 147. Id. 
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their personal data. However, as described in Part IV (and as one might 
expect), these firms have little desire to do so. 
III. BLOCKCHAIN-BASED PLATFORMS AS A REMEDY 
A. Blockchain: A Basic Primer 
The common thread uniting nearly all of the genetic sequencing 
companies that have adopted equitable compensation models is their 
use of blockchain technology.148 Blockchain technology is best known for 
facilitating the popular Bitcoin network, but it bears emphasis that it 
has an array of uses beyond the cryptocurrency sphere.149 This Note 
focuses almost exclusively on blockchain’s unique ability to grant 
consumers full and secure control over their genetic information (i.e., to 
determine who it is shared with and on what terms) when used in 
conjunction with smart contract technology. To understand how this is 
possible, however, it is necessary to first broadly (and simplistically) 
cover the technology’s fundamentals. To be sure, this analysis is far 
from exhaustive; it only seeks to broadly acquaint the reader with 
certain characteristics of blockchain technology that are relevant to the 
privacy and bioethical concerns thus described.150 
1. Decentralization 
At a high level, blockchains are merely sophisticated data 
storage systems.151 More commonly, they are defined as distributed or 
decentralized ledgers of information that are packaged together in 
bundles known as “blocks.”152 Each block is sequentially chained 
together and secured by an enhanced form of encryption known as 
 
 148. Grishin et al., supra note 14, at 5 (describing the compensation models of LunaDNA 
and EncrypGen––both of which incorporate blockchain technology––and diagramming the role of 
blockchain within Nebula’s compensation model).  
 149. Ozercan et al., supra note 6, at 1256. 
 150. This Note does not cover, for example, the distinction between decentralized,  
distributed, and permissioned blockchains. It should be noted, however, that permissioned  
blockchains—which require access to be granted to each specific node––are accordingly more  
centralized in nature and, thus, are relatively more likely to suffer the same ills as normal,  
centralized networks. See Gwyneth Iredale, Introduction to Permissioned Blockchains,  
101 BLOCKCHAINS (June 2, 2019), https://101blockchains.com/permissioned-blockchain 
[https://perma.cc/BL2Q-79YD]. 
 151. PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW: THE RULE OF 
CODE 27 (2018). 
 152. Ozercan et al., supra note 6, at 1256. 
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“cryptographic hashing.”153 Blockchains are not stored in any one place 
(such as a cloud-based server) or controlled by a single entity.154 Rather, 
a copy of each chain is stored in its entirety on a series of “nodes”  
(for example, the computer of someone connected to the blockchain 
network) that are in constant communication with one another, and 
that, crucially, must come to a consensus that any proposed alteration 
of a block is valid.155 Because each node operates independently from 
one another, no single point of attacking a network exists.156 Thus,  
the decentralized consensus mechanism––in conjunction with the  
high-strength encryption of each block––effectively shields information 
stored on a blockchain from unauthorized access.157 
2. Mining 
Each block is imbued with a “unique fingerprint” of code (known 
as a “hash”), a time stamp, and the hash of the block preceding it.158 The 
process of generating a new block is referred to as “proof of work,” which 
requires certain users (known as “miners”) to solve a complex 
mathematical problem that verifies both the information contained 
within the block and its respective hash.159 The rigorous nature of  
this process is intended to make altering the information stored on  
the blockchain exceptionally difficult, thereby securing network 
integrity.160 Indeed, it would be prohibitively expensive for any private 
party to attempt to manipulate the blocks stored on a major protocol 
such as Bitcoin.161  
 
 153. Id. (“Cryptographic hashes are summaries of data in binary format in which one small 
change in the original data yield a 50% chance of changing every bit of the earlier hash value. This 
means that it is impossible to find data that corresponds to a desired hash value due to its highly 
probabilistic and volatile nature.”). 
 154. Id. 
 155. DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 151, at 2; Jimi S., Blockchain: What Are Nodes and 
Masternodes?, MEDIUM (Sept. 5, 2018), https://medium.com/coinmonks/blockchain-what-is-a-node-
or-masternode-and-what-does-it-do-4d9a4200938f [https://perma.cc/PHG6-JXY5]. 
 156. DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 151, at 2. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 22. 
 159. Id. at 23. 
 160. Id. 
 161. One example of said manipulation is a “51% attack,” whereby a single organization or 
entity amasses enough mining power within a single network to effectively control and modify 
transactions. Id. at 25. Directing such an attack on a major network such as Bitcoin (which has 
thousands of nodes) would cost “hundreds of millions of dollars, if not billions.” Id. Even if such an 
attack were to occur, it would only risk the alteration of blocks generated during the period in 
which the attackers have control––that is, blocks that existed before the attack occurred  
would still remain virtually impenetrable. Jake Frankenfield, 51% Attack, INVESTOPEDIA, 
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3. Diagramming Blockchains by Analogy 
Analogizing these components to a digestible scenario may be 
helpful to better understand both their function and usefulness in the 
DTC-GT context.162 One such analogy posited by Professor Halil 
Ozercan first asks the reader to envision a town where all the banks 
have failed due to a repetitive spurt of government corruption.163 After 
the townspeople collectively decide that their reliance on centralized 
banks to store their financial information is no longer viable, a solution 
is formed164: 
[First, a] town meeting is called, and everyone joins with a new notebook. All citizens 
report and prove how much money they own. Everyone takes note of each other. 
After the meeting, when someone makes a transaction for any reason, they must 
announce this to everyone they know. If someone hears about a transaction, they 
make a note of [it on] the ongoing page of their notebook. They also must pass the 
information until it eventually reaches all townspeople. [Once this occurs,] [t]he 
transaction is considered to be completed, and accounts are updated when the page 
that contains it is closed. Everyone must close an ongoing page roughly at the same 
time. To achieve this . . . scientists of the town proposed a self-updating puzzle. 
When someone solves this puzzle, they publish their result with their ongoing page. 
If the solution is correct and their ongoing page does not include a faulty transaction, 
everyone copies the given page and closes it after adding a “rewarding transaction” 
(i.e., new “money”) to the solver.165 
The citizens in this example represent the “nodes” which foster 
the blockchain infrastructure, while their notebooks embody each 
node’s continually updating copy of the blockchain. Each page within 
that notebook and the personal financial information written upon it 
embodies a block.166 The fact that each page must be closed at the same 
time (the consensus mechanism) in conjunction with the solution of a 
complex puzzle (the mining process, known as “proof of work”) is a 
testament to the integrity and security of information stored on the 
blockchain; unless each citizen is on the same page, so to speak, the 






https://www.investopedia.com/terms/1/51-attack.asp [https://perma.cc/79HW-ACXT] (May 6, 
2019). 
 162. See Ozercan et al., supra note 6, at 1258. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
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B. The Utility of Smart Contracts and the Rise of “Blockchain 
Genomics” 
1. What Are Smart Contracts? 
Blockchains, as data storage systems, are able to retain or 
reference a variety of information, including a form of computer 
program colloquially known as a “smart contract.”168 For the purposes 
of this Note, smart contracts can be thought of as an autonomous, 
tamper-proof escrow accounts,169 or, more specifically, as automated, 
self-executing digital agreements that are dependent on blockchain 
technology.170 The basic concept of a smart contract is simple: once a 
party fulfills its performance obligations––memorialized via program 
code and embedded within a blockchain network––the other party is 
automatically compelled to execute its side of the deal.171 This means 
that when both parties agree to exchange purely digital information (as 
in the online purchase of an individual’s genetic information), the need 
for any intermediary or operator to enforce the contract’s terms 
disappears.172  
By ensuring mutual performance, smart contracts can operate 
as a critical tool in the equitable compensation movement, allowing 
consumers and firms to structure an array of flexible transactions. 
Anyone who possesses their own genetic data could, for example, “rent” 
it to a research entity via smart contract with the trust that the 
program will (i) ensure they get paid and (ii) automatically prohibit 
access to their data once the rental period expires.173  
2. Use Case: Nebula Genomics 
Smart contract technology is already being used to grant 
genetic-testing consumers the ability to rent or sell their information on 
 
 168. DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 151, at 27. 
 169. Deryck Gebe, How Smart Contracts and Stablecoins Will Reshape Escrow, 
CRPYTOSLATE (July 3, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://cryptoslate.com/how-smart-contracts-and-stable-
coins-will-reshape-escrow/ [https://perma.cc/3WBM-ZAVG]. 
 170. See DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 151, at 74 (“Smart contract code is executed in 
a distributed manner by all of the nodes supporting the underlying blockchain-based network, 
without necessarily relying on any intermediary operator or trusted middleman.”). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Ozercan et al., supra note 6, at 1261. 
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their own (relative) terms.174 Perhaps the best example of this system 
is the blockchain-based network engineered by Nebula Genomics, a 
direct-to-consumer sequencing firm that seeks to facilitate genetic 
research by giving consumers the ability to own and control access to 
their data.175 In line with this objective, the Nebula network provides a 
secure marketplace for “data buyers” (i.e., genetic researchers) and 
“data owners” (i.e., Nebula customers, or customers of other genetic 
testing firms) to negotiate and execute genetic data transactions 
through customized smart contracts.176 
First, to find the data they need, researchers may query the 
network for the results of optional health surveys filled out by 
anonymous data owners before or after their genetic samples are 
sequenced.177 Once the buyer identifies a subject for research, they may 
create a smart contract that specifies both the blockchain address of the 
data’s respective owner (who remains anonymous) and bid for their 
data, or, if they have yet to be sequenced, subsidize their sequencing 
costs.178 The owner may thereafter accept or reject the contract’s terms, 
perhaps because the bid is too low, or because they are repulsed by the 
identity of the research institution soliciting their data.179 If the offer is 
accepted, the proposed smart contract is executed, resulting in the 
simultaneous exchange of Nebula tokens and access to the owner’s 
data.180 The terms of the buyer’s access are subsequently registered on 
the blockchain and enforced by the network’s system of nodes.181 
 
 174. See, e.g., id. (describing the use of smart contracts in Nebula’s business model and that 
of Zenome, which similarly allows users to sell their genetic information). 
 175. See DENNIS GRISHIN, KAMAL OBBAD, PRESTON ESTEP, MIRZA CIFRIC, YINING 
ZHAO & GEORGE CHURCH, NEBULA GENOMICS: BLOCKCHAIN-ENABLED GENOMIC DATA SHARING 
AND ANALYSIS PLATFORM 23 (2018), http://arep.med.harvard.edu/pdf/Grishin_Church_v4.52_ 
2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VVL-H9NS]. The Nebula network is specifically built on Blockstack, a 
decentralized computing platform used for storage purposes, and the Ethereum-based Nebula 
blockchain. Id. at 15, 18. 
 176. Grishin et al., supra note 14, at 11. Nebula ensures consumers that “multiple  
mechanisms” are used to safeguard their genomic data and other personal information. GRISHIN 
ET AL., supra note 175, at 12. These mechanisms largely consist of allowing users to privately store 
and regulate access to their data via Blockstack, protecting their data and survey responses using 
homomorphic encryption, and storing all transaction records (but not genomic data) on the Nebula 
blockchain. Id. at 12, 15–18.  
 177. Id. at 18–19. 
 178. Id. at 23.  
 179. Grishin et al., supra note 14, at 18. 
 180. Id.; GRISHIN ET AL., supra note 175, at 23. 
 181. Grishin et al., supra note 14, at 18. 
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3. Important Limitations of Blockchain-Based Genomic Networks 
By granting users the power to broker their own genetic data on 
a secure and transparent system, the Nebula network represents both 
the antithesis of modern DTC-GT data-sharing practices and, as of now, 
the most socially optimal method of facilitating genetic research. 
Notwithstanding its comparative benefits, however, the concept of a 
blockchain-based genomic marketplace itself carries its own set of 
consumer-facing issues (albeit ones that are seemingly more 
manageable relative to those associated with the DTC-GT industry). 
Chief among these is the immutability of the blockchain, which 
effectively prevents parties who enter into a smart contract from being 
able to alter its terms or back out of a transaction.182  
With regard to Nebula specifically, it also remains unclear 
whether data that is transacted for can be exfiltrated from the system 
by whoever purchases it.183 Moreover, because it is infeasible (given its 
size) to store an individual’s fully sequenced genome on the blockchain, 
the genetic data itself must remain off-chain.184 This would diminish 
the strength of the Nebula network’s security. To its credit, Nebula 
thinly addresses this concern by giving consumers the flexibility to 
choose how their data is privately stored.185 It fails to remedy, however, 
the fact that the actual sequencing of genetic samples must flow 
through its own servers, adding a degree of centralization that brings 
with it the same aforementioned risks of genetic exposure.186 This 
dilemma, however, could only be avoided by decentralizing the 
sequencing process––that is, by enabling individuals to sequence 
themselves.187 This would require portable sequencing machines,  
which remain mere “hypothetical proposal[s]” within the genomics 
community.188 
Nebula’s compensation system also raises its own ethical 
concerns. For one, data owners are only able to receive compensation by 
either having the costs of sequencing subsidized by a data buyer189  
 
 182.  Id. at 8.  
 183. Brad Jones, Nebula Genomics Will Let You Rent Out Your Genetic Information, 
FUTURISM (Feb. 20, 2018), https://futurism.com/nebula-genomics-rent-genetic-information 
[https://perma.cc/4AN8-LKUB]. 
 184. Ozercan et al., supra note 6, at 1261–62. 
 185. GRISHIN ET AL., supra note 175, at 18. 
 186. Id. at 24. 
 187. Id.; Ozercan et al., supra note 6, at 1262. 
 188. Ozercan et al., supra note 6, at 1262. 
 189. GRISHIN ET AL., supra note 175, at 23. It remains unclear whether or not Nebula has 
actually implemented this subsidy option for consumers. See NEBULA GENOMICS, FAQ, 
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or, if they’ve already paid for sequencing services, exchanging their 
genetic data for Nebula tokens (sold by Nebula to data buyers for fiat 
money) that are only redeemable for additional Nebula-related 
services.190 It is fair to question whether this practice truly represents 
an equitable form of compensation. Moreover, even if Nebula permitted 
data owners to monetarily benefit from their sequenced data, they may 
not understand its true fair market value, allowing researchers to 
purchase it for a price far below its true worth.191  
In spite of these concerns, blockchain-based networks like 
Nebula’s offer an intriguing pathway forward for the genetic testing 
industry as a whole. No other form of data management is 
simultaneously capable of addressing the previously noted bioethical 
concerns while also ensuring the flow of genetic information for 
beneficial research. Consumer advocates should thus take heart in the 
fact that such genomic marketplaces are slightly on the rise: other  
start-ups, like EncrypGen or Zenome, either currently or plan to offer 
researchers the opportunity to purchase genetic data directly from 
consumers in exchange for cryptocurrency.192 However, unlike Nebula, 
neither of these firms seem to offer in-house sequencing services193 and, 
in the case of EncrypGen, are relatively less transparent with how their 
blockchain systems work.194 Thus, as of now, the Nebula model seems 
to be the gold standard––one that major DTC-GT firms might do well 
to study and potentially emulate in the near future. 
IV. THE FTC AS A FACILITATIVE VEHICLE FOR BLOCKCHAIN ADOPTION 
A. When Market Forces Won’t Work: A Space for Limited Regulatory 
Action 
To some degree, the public’s increasingly skeptical approach to 
both the security of genetic data and the ethics of its sale likely 
 
https://nebulagenomics.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/sections/360003713751-FAQ (last visited Feb. 6, 
2020) (failing to mention any form of available consumer subsidy). 
 190. GRISHIN ET AL., supra note 175, at 14. 
 191. See Grishin et al., supra note 14, at 19 (“Personal data marketplaces also would be 
asymmetric, since individuals are likely to be unaware of the value of their personal data and are 
thus at risk of not being compensated fairly.”). 
 192. Ozercan et al., supra note 6, at 1261; Our Views & Directions, ZENOME, https://ze-
nome.io/about/ [https://perma.cc/B9CG-44TC] (last visited on Feb. 6, 2020). 
 193. Ozercan et al., supra note 6, at 1261; see Emily Mullin, This New Company Wants  
to Sequence Your Genome and Let You Share It on a Blockchain, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 7,  
2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/2018/02/07/145768/this-new-company-wants-to-se-
quence-your-genome-and-let-you-share-it-on-a-blockchain/ [https://perma.cc/PS2A-6TKS]. 
 194. Ozercan et al., supra note 6, at 1261. 
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contributed to the DTC-GT industry’s recent slump.195 Nevertheless, 
industry-leading firms—which, as discussed, have a vested interest in 
controlling consumer information—seem more willing to speculate 
other, broader economic trends as a cause of slowed sales.196 Assuming, 
however, the aforementioned concerns are at least partially to blame 
for the industry’s rut, it would illuminate a financial incentive for  
DTC-GT firms to embrace more transparent, secure, and equitable data 
management practices. 
Perhaps, then, the DTC-GT market will adjust on its own. One 
could assume that as the Nebulas of the world grow in number and 
legitimacy, so too will their customer bases, creating further pressure 
for DTC-GT firms to offer analogous, consumer-friendly features (e.g., 
heightened security and compensation) or even adopt blockchain-based 
platforms. Leaving the market to its own devices, however, is unlikely 
to produce any noticeable shift in firm behavior. For one, larger firms 
like 23andMe and Ancestry enjoy massive user bases, resources, and 
brand recognition which affords them a sizable “first mover advantage” 
over smaller competitors.197 This grants them the institutional 
legitimacy needed to secure special FDA clearance to market predictive 
health tests—potentially a substantial hurdle for younger firms—and 
the financial security to explore new ways of generating revenue.198 
23andMe, for instance, recently sold the rights to a drug it developed 
in-house, the first of many licensing deals in its future.199 All told, it 
seems unlikely that larger DTC-GT firms will face any formidable 
market pressure to change the way they store and use genetic 
information; absent an external force, DTC-GT firms will continue to 
monetize—not undermine—their ability to control it. 
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 198. See Clayton et al., supra note 11, at 16 (describing 23andMe’s passage through various 
FDA hurdles to market predictive health tests). 
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B. Using the FTC’s “Information-Forcing” Tools to Study and 
Encourage Blockchain Adoption 
1. Why the FTC? 
From a social welfare perspective, some form of intervention into 
DTC-GT data-management practices seems appropriate—particularly 
one that promotes the broader adoption of blockchain technology by 
DTC-GT firms.200 This could take a variety of forms. Congress, of course, 
could finally address genetic privacy issues by enacting legislation that 
mandates DTC-GT firms to adopt more secure and transparent  
data-management practices, similar to the state laws of Alaska or 
Nevada.201 Alternatively, regulators like the FTC could attempt to 
shoehorn in those practices through rulemaking or adjudicative 
enforcement.202 However, as discussed below, such aggressive  
tactics are inadvisable given their potential to economically disrupt 
DTC-GT firms or discourage them from developing innovative,  
consumer-friendly platforms.203 
Notably, those who advocate for enhanced regulatory oversight 
of the DTC-GT industry frequently cite the FTC as the appropriate body 
to spearhead the effort.204 Indeed, the FTC, which carries the  
broad statutory authority to police “unfair or deceptive” commercial 
practices,205 now resonates as “the closest thing the United States has 
to a privacy regulator,”206 overseeing or engaging in privacy-oriented 
“civil law enforcement, business outreach and consumer education, 
 
 200. See CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY 
175 (2016) (remarking that, in self-regulating industries, “some external force, such as threat of 
suit from the government or legislation,” can cause industries to effectively regulate themselves in 
the public interest). 
 201. Supra Section I.D.2.  
 202. Infra Section IV.B. 
 203. Walter G. Johnson, Blockchain Meets Genomics: Governance Considerations for  
Promoting Food Safety and Public Health, 15. J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 74, 94 (2019). 
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press conference to warn consumers of the potential risks of at-home DNA testing” and “asked  
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 205. Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as 
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policy initiatives, and recommendations to Congress to enact 
legislation” for more than a decade.207  
Notwithstanding its broad scope of authority, the FTC reserves 
its enforcement power solely for those businesses that either deceive 
consumers regarding their level of privacy or fail to implement 
“reasonable” data security measures,208 an objective standard that 
weighs various consumer- and business-facing interests against one 
another.209 Enforcement actions of either variety, while growing in 
frequency, are usually rare, and normally (but not always) occur in the 
aftermath of a large-scale data breach or severe mishandling of 
consumer information.210 As the FTC lacks injunctive authority, it often 
seeks to enter into rigid, court-enforced settlement agreements known 
as “consent orders” that bind the target business to pay a certain civil 
penalty and adopt enhanced privacy or security practices.211 Because 
the FTC publishes its consent orders, they also result in steep negative 
publicity for the business.212 
In 2018, the FTC made a de facto public admission regarding the 
launch of an investigation into the general privacy policies of DTC-GT 
firms.213 The status of this inquiry is unknown, though it bears noting 
that the FTC’s investigations are incredibly lengthy, often taking more 
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than a year to complete.214 Thus, it is possible that a major DTC-GT 
player could soon be the target of an enforcement action. Nevertheless, 
if the goal is to promote a more socially optimal genetic testing industry, 
targeted enforcement would likely prove counterproductive. A widely 
publicized consent order, for instance, could compound already shaky 
consumer confidence in genetic testing, further diminishing test  
kit sales and, thus, the pool of information available for publicly 
beneficial research.215 This would neutralize a significant rationale for 
implementing the technology in the first place.216 Moreover, it may lock 
certain businesses into adopting a security or privacy practice (e.g., a 
type of encryption) that may soon be obsolete. 
Recognizing the significance of its enforcement power, the FTC 
primarily relies on softer, “information-forcing” methods to initially 
encourage businesses to adopt better privacy practices.217 This usually 
involves (i) sponsoring industry-specific “workshops,” a public forum 
that brings together stakeholders to discuss “privacy problems, new 
business models, and public policy approaches;”218 (ii) publishing 
guidance;219 and (iii) endorsing voluntary standards crafted by 
nonregulatory agencies, as it recently did with the National Institute of 
Science and Technology’s (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework.220 All of 
these methods suffice as a way for the FTC to both build proper 
expertise and signal its preference for a specific practice or behavior 
without exercising its legal authority—potentially inducing risk-averse 
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2. Proposal: Forming a “Blockchain Genomics” Task Force for 
Consumer Education and Voluntary Standard Promulgation 
The FTC can and should rely on information-forcing practices to 
encourage the adoption of blockchain-based platforms in the DTC-GT 
industry. Ideally, this would entail the publication of agency guidance 
that better informs consumers of the risks of genetic exposure, gives 
risk-averse DTC-GT firms the chance to prudently adjust their 
information management systems, and provides the basis for future 
enforcement actions.  
While this process could take a variety of forms, it should 
broadly consist of at least two stages—namely, a period of agency and 
stakeholder education followed by the endorsement or publication of 
voluntary standards. 
First, to grasp how blockchain technology can assist the 
responsible management of genetic data, the FTC should task its own 
“Blockchain Working Group” (launched in 2018 to study fraudulent 
cryptocurrency activity), to conduct market research.222 This should 
include a comprehensive study of the DTC-GT industry’s information 
management practices, assessment of blockchain technology’s evolving 
uses and functionality, and a general evaluation of its strengths and 
weaknesses in reducing consumer privacy risks. The Working Group 
should also establish collaborative channels with research agencies like 
NIST (which has already published a general blockchain study) to fill 
in any technical knowledge gaps.223 The information gleaned from this 
stage could then be distilled into digestible pieces of agency guidance 
made available to the public. It could also spur informative dialogue 
between the FTC and industry stakeholders at future agency-sponsored 
“workshops.”224 
Next, the FTC should publish voluntary standards that 
encourage DTC-GT firms to integrate blockchain technology with their 
information management systems.225 These standards could, for 
example, be the basis for an incentive system analogous to the Center 
for Medicaid Service’s (CMS) Electronic Health Record (EHR) Incentive 
Program, which “provide[s] incentive payments to eligible . . . hospitals 
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as they demonstrate adoption, implementation, upgrading, or 
meaningful use of certified EHR technology.”226 Alternatively, the FTC 
could merely suggest that preemptive compliance with these standards 
will likely insulate a DTC-GT from a future enforcement action. To 
determine the best course of action, the agency could once again rely on 
the outside expertise of NIST—which regularly revises EHR Incentive 
Program standards—or a private standard-setting body like the ISO or 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE).227 
Notably, both stages of the standard-setting process would 
require the FTC to confront several thorny policy issues. Principally, 
the agency would need to determine a type of blockchain ledger to 
endorse (e.g., permissioned or permission-less, a distinction that this 
Note, for purpose of brevity, does not cover); how genetic data should be 
valued; and how much control individuals should maintain over their 
data throughout a given transaction. Overall, the FTC would need to 
determine just how far it should go to spur DTC-GT firms to adopt 
blockchain technology—ultimately requiring the agency to weigh the 
private costs of blockchain adoption against the public costs of allowing 
DTC-GT firms to broker their customers’ genetic data. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The ability for DTC-GT firms to centralize and subsequently 
peddle the genetic information of consenting consumers raises serious 
privacy and bioethical concerns. In the absence of substantive 
regulatory oversight, these consumers place themselves at risk of 
genetic exposure—which, for them or their family, could prove 
devastating, particularly as DNA is increasingly used to identify 
individuals and secure their possessions. They also open themselves  
up to the wider dignitary harm of having fundamentally defining 
information used for profit without compensation. Ironically,  
these concerns may ultimately constrain the overall pool of genetic 
information available for beneficial medicinal research by 
disincentivizing consumers from taking a genetic test in the first place. 
As start-ups like Nebula demonstrate, the adoption of 
blockchain technology within the genetic testing industry presents a 
feasible way to help remedy some or all of these concerns. Yet, in the 
absence of serious competition, major DTC-GT firms have little 
incentive to explore these systems. There is, however, ample room for a 
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privacy regulator like the FTC to wield its soft power to nudge the 
industry in that direction, laying a foundation for its widespread 
adoption of blockchain technology in the not-so-distant future. 
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